Example sentences of "[art] shareholders ' " in BNC.

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1 Ron Atkinson , the Sheffield Wednesday manager , yesterday promised the shareholders ' AGM that the team will not be relegated and will climb from the bottom of the First Division by Christmas .
2 In the long term , he argues correctly , this is in the shareholders ' interest too .
3 For the most part , however , the solution will lie more on the managers ' side than the shareholders ' : the managers need to be given incentives that make them less likely to make the colossal errors of the 1960s .
4 A different form of control liability will , however , apply if the dominant undertaking — whether or not a shareholder — has formalised its relationship with the public company concerned by a control contract which provides for it to manage the company and in which it offers the minority shareholders a buy-out or , at the shareholders ' option , to pay them an annual protected dividend .
5 ‘ What did the auditors think they were doing when they signed off the accounts ? ’ asked one shareholder , while another accused TR of acting more like ‘ the directors ' poodle ’ than the shareholders ' watchdog .
6 The company took the decision to restate the accounts , Mr Clements added , when it became clear that the delays and uncertainties involved would not be in the shareholders ' best interests .
7 At this stage , as Ernst & Young does not have access to the shareholders ' list , it is unaware of the numbers involved , but it estimates that compensation payments may total £1.4m .
8 It believes that it is the shareholders ' responsibility to take action if a company qualifies its statement of compliance .
9 Therefore , so far as the original shareholders were concerned , clause 3 of the shareholders ' agreement did not amount to an unlawful fetter on the company 's statutory power to increase its share capital ; it was simply a personal agreement outside the articles between the shareholders who executed it about how they would exercise their voting rights in relation to the creation or issue of shares , and did not purport to bind future shareholders .
10 Of course , for family companies , such tax planning may have to be balanced against the shareholders ' natural desire to have their money as soon as possible !
11 In Caparo the House of Lords reviewed the statutory provisions relating to the position of auditors and concluded that although they undoubtedly created a relationship between auditors and shareholders , that relationship did not extend to the protection of all the shareholders ' possible interests .
12 The shareholders ' accrued interest in profits retained within the life funds comes to £2.4bn .
13 We felt so sorry for you at the shareholders ' meeting .
14 Hayling , Walsh and the others gravely signed undertakings to appear in the prospectus that they would look after the shareholders ' money and manage the company in a ‘ responsible and profitable manner ’ .
15 In a world of perfect competition it would not be possible for managers to deviate from the profit-maximization norm for any length of time even if they were tempted to pursue their own rather than the shareholders ' interests .
16 Control is vested in their hands rather than the shareholders ' .
17 All that is needed is to specify clearly those occasions when there is a strong danger that directors may be tempted to act in their own self-interest and then to make the shareholders ' consent necessary in those circumstances .
18 Clearly the shareholders ' interest tends to be a purely financial one ; employees have an interest in the security of their jobs and the type of life they lead within the workplace ; consumers have an interest in the type and quality of the goods and services produced ; and the local community has an interest in the company as a supplier of jobs and livelihoods and as a potential threat to the local environment .
19 Wright , Swinfen Eady J held that directors owed their fiduciary duties to the company and not to the company 's shareholders and thereby denied shareholders recourse to a direct action against directors who had used inside information at their ( the shareholders ' ) expense .
20 Secondly , in the Fearon case it was not the right to exercise an economic activity which was conditional on the shareholders ' satisfying the residence requirement , but merely immunity from compulsory acquisition measures adopted under legislation governing the ownership of rural land designed to ensure as far as possible that the land belonged to those who worked it .
21 The validity of this reasoning ultimately depends , it is suggested , on the genuineness of the shareholders ' consent to the resulting situation .
22 Needless to say , a full-scale review of the moral justification of private property will not be undertaken , but enough will be said to indicate that there are substantial difficulties in the way of providing a satisfactory justification of corporate power by reference to the shareholders ' supposed moral ownership rights .
23 Before moving on it should however be noted that it does not follow from the rejection of justificatory theories of corporate power based on antecedent rights that the shareholders ' legal rights in the company , including the right to exercise ultimate control and to have the business operated in their interests , are not morally defensible .
24 If , as will be considered next , companies serve the public interest by seeking to maximise their profits , then the shareholders ' rights may be justifiable on functional grounds , that is , by virtue of their role in securing the efficient operation of the business .
25 Secondly , it will be examined why , granted the profit maximisation objective , the profits should accrue to the shareholders , as opposed , for example , to the employees : if considerations of efficiency underscore the shareholders ' current position of preeminence , then this may be thought to provide a justificatory foundation for shareholder rights within a public interest framework .
26 The model is so named because it describes a mechanism designed to compel managers to act in the shareholders ' interests which depends on vesting owner-like rights in the shareholders , as mentioned , to appoint , monitor , and replace the most senior tier of management and to make certain other fundamental decisions .
27 The point is not merely that decisions about the day to day operation of the business or even long-term strategy have been taken out of the shareholders ' hands — this is the intended , central advantage of the corporate form — but that the shareholders are no longer able to shape the purpose for which the business is run , that is , they are unable to oblige management to maximise profits .
28 Furthermore , since the board is dominated by the most senior representatives of management ( this term will be used , except where the context requires otherwise , to refer to the executive directors and senior managers ) it can hardly be regarded as a body providing independent supervision of management on the shareholders ' behalf .
29 Under the influence of excessive risk aversion managers are thus liable to cause the firm to grow to an inefficient size and to engage in other forms of behaviour which are sub-optimal from the shareholders ' point of view , such as making low dividend payouts and an inadequate use of the company 's borrowing capacity .
30 They thus obtain status and other ‘ psychological ’ benefits at the shareholders ' expense , and increase their rewards from office in a more tax-efficient way than through regular remuneration .
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