Example sentences of "court have [to-vb] [art] [noun] " in BNC.

  Next page
No Sentence
1 Whatever the nature of the amenities lost the court has to assess the effect of the deprivation of those amenities upon the particular plaintiff .
2 On conviction , the court has to set a value on the drug assets earned during the previous six years , and a confiscation order .
3 In cases in which pain and suffering is not expected to continue for life the court has to form a view as to how long it is likely to continue .
4 Where the defendant 's breach of duty is followed by a third party act which is also a cause of the plaintiff 's damage , the court has to determine the extent of the defendant 's liability .
5 That means that the court has to consider the position immediately before an emergency protection order , if there was one , or an interim care order , if that was the initiation of protection , or , as in this case , when the child went into voluntary care .
6 The court has to consider the child 's welfare as the court 's paramount consideration , and also has to consider the various aspects referred to under section 1(3) , that is they have to consider the wishes of the children , their needs , the likely effects on the children of change , the characteristics of the children , the nature of the harm they have suffered and the capability of the parents or anybody else offering themselves as carers , which would include of course the grandparents in this case .
7 Under section 1(4) ( b ) of the Children Act 1989 , the court has to consider the guidelines under section 1 in deciding whether to make a care order or supervision order .
8 It is clear that in exercising the discretion the court has to balance the requirements of the liquidator against any possible oppression to the person to be examined .
9 Mr replied that is what Mr was asking the other to do , that is to hold their hand and to enter into negotiations , now I fully appreciate that erm doctor feels strongly that the defendants have not been negotiating in good faith and have been simply dragging matters out for his benefit , now when I say that I 'm simply saying what I understand to be doctor view , I 'm certainly not suggesting that I 'm finding as a fact , but that was the decision , indeed I could n't cos I 've not heard all the evidence on this matter not as Mr to address me on that one , it seems to me with all respect to doctor missions on this matter that if there has been any dragging of feet or other improper conduct of either the defendants in connection with er they remain on in the premises and not paying what doctor would consider to be a full and proper rent or if there has been problem about their not disclosing documents when they should have done , the position is that doctor has er by making an appropriate application to the court , for maybe the appropriate relief arising out of the facts which he can establish , but that is not in general a matter which erm the court should go into on the question of taxation , it 's not , th this particular taxation of costs is a taxation as I understand it that are formally to the debt of the order of Mr Justice and there is thus no question of the court having to consider the question when the those tax those costs have been swollen or increased in any way by reason of spinning out negotiations whether to run up costs or otherwise , that simply does n't arising it seems to me in this case that maybe a matter which may arise possibly at some future date , though I would hope it would not do so , but er so far as the costs down to the end of the trial of the twentieth of March nineteen ninety one are concerned , it seems to me the fact that the parties maybe negotiating subsequently to deter to rece to resolve the outstanding issue , it 's not a matter which really goes to the question of erm what is the proper amount to allow for taxation of costs which have already been incurred , before these negotiations erm we do n't the figure of the costs appears to have been effectively agreed between the solicitors at forty two thousand pounds , the plaintiff solicitors made it quite clear that they were seeking interest , this was clear in apparently of nineteen ninety two , but this held their hand , er it seems to me the reason they held their hand rather than indicate it was because the defendant through his solicitor was asking them to do so and it seems to me that Mr was acting very sensibly in the defendants interest , because if in fact they had gone ahead and taxed their costs there and then the position would simply be that there would of been an award for taxation , in order , there would be a taxation resulting in an order for payment of of some cost probably in the region of forty two thousand pounds and er that order would itself carry interest under the judgements act , it does n't seem to me it can be sensibly said that erm any interest has to be in any way increased by reason of this delay and it seems to me that erm if one looks at order sixty two and twenty eight er certainly under paragraph B two erm there 's a reference there to any additional interest payable under section seventeen because of the failure on the May , erm , it does n't seem to me that the effect of what has in fact incurred , in this case has been , caused any additional interest to be paid and er it seems to me the only best that I can see in the evidence before me to , which would enable the court to erm , conclude that there should be a disallowance of interest would be as I say because the plaintiffs appear not to have perfected the order for the payment of perfectively two years , just over two years , erm it seems to me however that , that on balance probably it simply a matter of oversight and even if it had been perfected it would n't of made as I guess the least bit of difference to the way the negotiations er proceeded and accordingly I take the view that erm there are no grounds for disallowing interest from either the plaintiffs bill of costs or the defendants bill of costs , accordingly erm to allow the defendants appeal in preparation to the disallowance of costs er interest and to dismiss the defendants appeal for application in relation to an additional period , P sixty of course disallowed , I also propose to dismiss the sum of , the appeal by the plaintiffs from the refusal of taxing master to disallow the interest on the defendants bill of costs .
10 But before these matters could be considered the court had to address an argument for the Crown which , if it had succeeded , would have brought an immediate end to the matter .
11 In the Trust House Forte case the court had to interpret the assumption that premises were available for letting for shopping and retail purposes : the issue was whether the premises were to be taken as available for letting purposes only or whether they could be taken as to be available for letting for any other purpose permitted by the lease .
12 Held , dismissing the appeal , that the expression ‘ is suffering … significant harm ’ in section 31(2) ( a ) of the Children Act 1989 referred to the point in time immediately before the process of protecting the child began , so that , in determining whether the first threshold condition of section 31(2) was satisfied , the court had to consider the position before the commencement of the voluntary care when the children were with the mother ; that the condition in section 31(2) ( b ) related to care by the parent or carer whose lack of care had caused the significant harm to the child and not to the care which might be given by other carers if no care order were to be made , which only became relevant once the threshold conditions under section 31(2) had been satisfied in deciding whether or not a care order should be made ; and that it could not be said that the family proceedings court had been wrong in concluding , first , that the threshold conditions were satisfied and , secondly , on the evidence , that a care order to the local authority was the appropriate order ( post , pp. 1013H — 1014A , E–F , H — 1015B ) .
13 Decision : the Court had to consider the legality of the sentences imposed , with particular references to Magistrates ' Courts Act 1980 , s.133 .
14 It was conceded that their removal by the mother was wrongful within the terms of article 3 and accordingly the court had to consider the terms of article 12 which provides :
15 In Rolls Razor Co. v. Cox ( 1967 C.A ) the court had to consider the status of some travelling salesmen .
16 After this the law became increasingly convoluted as the courts tried to escape the rigours of a rule which meant that the court had to make a finding in favour of one party or the other .
17 In order to answer that question the court had to balance the interest to be served by non-disclosure against the interest served by disclosure .
18 The fact that the threshold test is met does not mean that the family proceedings court have to make a care order .
19 This , following the House of Lords decision in Scottish Insurance v. Wilson & Clyde Coal Co was , in effect , done by capital reductions even though the shares were irredeemable and quoted at above par , for the Lords decided in that case and in Prudential Assurance v. Chatterley-Whitfield Collieries in the same year , that the courts had to confirm the reductions since the preference shareholders were being treated in strict accordance with their class rights .
20 The English courts had to consider the meaning of the phrase ‘ civil or commercial matter ’ as used in section 9(1) of the Evidence ( Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions ) Act 1975 , passed mainly to give effect to the Convention ; the precise question was whether the evidence sought was ‘ for the purposes of civil proceedings … before the requesting court ’ within section 1 of the Act , the italicised phrase being interpreted in section 9 to mean proceedings in any civil or commercial matter .
21 The courts have to draw a line somewhere when it comes to obviousness although it is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules .
  Next page