Example sentences of "of [noun sg] date [adj] [noun] " in BNC.
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| 1 | I hereby surrender the lease of the above premises dated 19 May 1972 in consideration of you accepting the goods set out in the inventory below in full and final settlement of all claims and demands against me under the terms of the said lease and specified in the notice of distress dated 2 March 1988 . |
| 2 | By a writ issued on 15 November 1988 and a statement of claim dated 16 February 1990 , the plaintiff , Christopher de Martell , claimed damages from the defendants , the Merton and Sutton Health Authority , for personal injuries and consequential loss arising out of the alleged negligent treatment afforded to him at St. Helier Hospital , Carshalton , on or about 5 February 1967 when his mother , who was pregnant with the plaintiff , underwent an attempted forceps delivery and a caesarean section . |
| 3 | By an amended statement of claim dated 7 April 1989 the Securities and Investments Board ( ‘ S.I.B . ’ ) |
| 4 | He further ordered the original bills of lading dated 29 January 1991 relating to the cargo to be deposited with the court . |
| 5 | In the absence of radiocarbon dates these interpretations must remain untested but attractive hypotheses . |
| 6 | For the later range of radiocarbon dates this calibration is well-established . |
| 7 | The analysis of an array of radiocarbon dated lake-sediment cores provides an alternative means of assessing the sustained impact of deforestation on a large catchment scale . |
| 8 | Between the 14th day of September 1987 and the 8th day of January 1988 conspired together and with other persons to defraud such persons who had or might have had an interest in dealing in shares in Blue Arrow , or National Westminster Bank , or in dealing on the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 share index , namely : 2.1 By dishonestly concealing holdings of 19.39 per cent of the share capital of Blue Arrow ; 2.2 By falsely stating that all remaining shares not taken up in the rights issue by existing shareholders had been sold in the market ; 2.3 By falsely representing that 33,315,528 shares in Blue Arrow held by County NatWest Securities were held for the purposes of market making ; 2.4 By falsely representing that 34,069,433 shares in Blue Arrow held by Phillips & Drew Securities were held for the purposes of market making ; 2.5 By dealing off market with Union Bank of Switzerland in 28,201,743 shares in Blue Arrow when by reason of their connection with that company they were knowingly in possession of un-published price sensitive information ; 2.6 By creating a false instrument , namely a letter of indemnity dated 5 October 1987 from Nicholas Wells on behalf of County NatWest to Union Bank Of Switzerland ; 2.7 By engaging in a course of conduct which created a false or misleading impression as to the market in the shares of Blue Arrow for the purpose of creating such an impression and thereby influencing persons who might deal in those shares ; 2.8 By purchasing and retaining 2,150 Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 share index put option contracts to cover a risk of £51,500,000 whilst concealing from the market the true position in relation to the rights issue and the subsequent placing of shares in Blue Arrow , where Blue Arrow and National Westminster Bank were both component parts of that index . |
| 9 | ‘ The Project ’ shall mean the programme of work to be carried out by the Parties to the Agreement in accordance with the terms and conditions of the IEATP ‘ Grant Offer Letter ’ which shall mean the letter from the Secretary of State dated 10 July 1990 and attached as Addendum C. |
| 10 | By a notice of motion dated 11 September 1985 George Albert Auger , the trustee in bankruptcy of Winston Lloyd Dennis sought against Stuart Bernard Goodman and Hilgay Archer , the executors of the will of the wife of the bankrupt , and the bankrupt ( 1 ) a declaration that the trustee was in the events which , had happened solely and beneficially entitled as trustee of the property of the bankrupt to the property situate at and known as 100 , Gurney Road , West Ham , London E.15 registered at H.M. Land Registry and comprised in Title No . |
| 11 | By notice of motion dated 1 March 1990 Mr. Smart applied for judicial review of that decision but on 18 January 1991 the Divisional Court ( Mann L.J . |
| 12 | By a notice of motion dated 14 February 1992 the local authority appealed against those parts of the order which directed that there should be no contact between the father and the girl until after the local authority review and that there should be supervised contact between the girl and her half-sister , on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to invite the parties to comment on the agreed proposals for contact ; ( 2 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to indicate to the parties the nature of the orders for contact which they proposed to make , thereby depriving the parties of the opportunity to make submissions relating to those proposals ; ( 3 ) the justices had wrongly exercised their discretion in authorising the local authority to refuse contact to the girl by the father for only six months when they had found as a fact , inter alia , that the father had abused the girl over a period of at least 18 months ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to impose the condition of supervision on contact between the girl and her half-sister when there had been no application for such contact to be supervised , the evidence was that the half-sister had been enjoying unsupervised contact and that there was no evidence that there was any risk of the girl coming into contact with her father while having contact with her half-sister , and the justices had heard evidence that the local authority were considering placing the girl with her half-sister and by their order they had precluded the local authority from making such a placement and had fettered the discretion of the local authority ; and ( 5 ) the order was therefore contrary to the girl 's best interests . |
| 13 | By notice of motion dated 14 May 1990 the Director of Public Prosecutions sought judicial review of ( 1 ) the decision of a single justice sitting at the Liverpool Magistrates ' Court on 16 February 1990 declining to proceed under section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 in respect of John James Bell , who had been arrested pursuant to section 7(3) of the Act , until such time as the bench was composed of at least two justices ; ( 2 ) her decision adjourning the proceedings to a court sitting on 19 February 1990 for evidence to be called and until such time remanding the defendant in custody ; and ( 3 ) the decision on 19 February 1990 of the justices before whom the adjourned decision came declining jurisdiction to hear the section 7(5) proceedings . |
| 14 | By notice of motion dated 13 November 1990 Mr. Pegg applied for judicial review of those decisions but on 18 January the Divisional Court ( Mann L.J . |
| 15 | The taxpayer sought , by notice of motion dated 2 November 1992 , an order that the Crown 's appeal against the Special Commissioner 's decision be struck out under RSC Ord 18 , r 19 . |
| 16 | By notice of motion dated 23 March 1990 Mr. Pierson applied for judicial review of that decision but on 18 January 1991 the Divisional Court ( Mann L.J . |
| 17 | By notice of motion dated 12 April 1991 the plaintiff made application to the county court for committal to prison of the defendants , alleging breach of the injunction by their execution of a charge over the property . |
| 18 | A contract of sale dated 27 May 1675 establishes that Jacques Hotteterre , the son of Louis and Marie Mauger , was living in London where he was employed as an ‘ officier de la musique du Roy de La Grande Bretagne ’ . |
| 19 | In a contract of sale dated 11 December 1750 , in which he sold land in La Couture to Jean Plisson , he is described as a maker of musical instruments ( Arch . |
| 20 | By a notice of application dated 27 November 1989 the defendant applied to the county court for the possession order to be set aside . |
| 21 | My Lords , this appeal arises out of a memorandum of agreement dated 19 December 1930 and said to have created a lease for a term which was not limited to expire by effluxion of time and can not now be determined by the landlord . |
| 22 | the grounds of appeal dated 11 May 1992 ; |
| 23 | By a notice of appeal dated 13 January 1992 the council appealed on the grounds that the assistant recorder ( 1 ) misdirected himself in holding that the question of suitability of given future accommodation for the purpose of sections 65 and 69 was one of fact and fell to be determined by the county court in proceedings for breach of statutory duty , and ( 2 ) ought to have held that the plaintiff should have proceeded by way of an application for judicial review . |
| 24 | By a notice of appeal dated 13 August 1991 the applicant appealed against that decision of the Divisional Court on the grounds , inter alia , that it had erred ( 1 ) in holding that there was no obligation on Lautro to give the applicant an opportunity to make representations prior to the issue of that notice ; ( 2 ) in asserting that there was a principle of law that a regulatory body should know with precision from whom they must invite representations ; ( 3 ) in perceiving any difficulty in identifying persons who should have been given advance notification , so as to be treated fairly , of any proposals by Lautro to issue a notice since such notification should at least be given to anyone who would be directly affected by such a notice and/or whose conduct was in issue ; ( 4 ) in regarding as apposite the remarks of Lord Diplock in Cheall v. Association of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff [ 1983 ] 2 A.C. 180 , 190A since the non-application of the legal concept of natural justice to all persons effected by but not parties to a dispute was not and had never been in issue ; and ( 5 ) in failing to have regard to the absence of any rights of appeal according to the rules of Lautro in deciding whether the principle of natural justice applied . |
| 25 | By notice of appeal dated 26 February 1991 Mr. Pegg appealed against that refusal on the grounds that the Divisional Court had erred ( 1 ) in rejecting the proposition that it would be Wednesbury unreasonable for the Secretary of State to fix Mr. Pegg 's tariff ( as a person serving a mandatory term of life imprisonment ) by reference to a period of retribution and deterrence which was higher than that recommended by the judiciary ; ( 2 ) in rejecting submissions that the tariff procedure was in breach of procedural propriety in that the court considered itself bound by the wrong decision of Payne v. Lord Harris of Greenwich [ 1981 ] 1 W.L.R. 754 ; and ( 3 ) in rejecting submissions that the decision to refuse his petition should be quashed and viewing that the tariff belonged solely to the Secretary of State to determine . |
| 26 | By a notice of appeal dated 7 July 1992 the husband appealed on the ground that a copy of the committal order had not been served on him either before or at the time of the execution of the warrant as required by Ord. 29 , r. 1(5) ( a ) of the County Court Rules 1981 ( as amended ) and that in consequence the order was invalid and/or defective and should be set aside . |
| 27 | By a notice of appeal dated 1 March 1991 the defendant appealed on the grounds , inter alia , ( 1 ) that the donee of the power of appointment , the defendant 's mother , Mrs. Mary Steed , did not know that she had been appointed attorney by the defendant and accordingly could not have known that she had any power to deal with his property when she executed the transfer of 4 September 1979 , and that in those circumstances the plea of non est factum ought to have succeeded on the judge 's finding that the donee was tricked into signing the transfer ; ( 2 ) the judge having rightly concluded that the transaction as affected was not a sale , save possibly at such a gross undervalue as to vitiate it as a sale , should therefore have held that the transfer was void and ineffective ; ( 3 ) the judge having rightly concluded that he retained a discretion to rectify the charges register against the registered holder , notwithstanding , as he found , that ( i ) the title of the mortgagors , Mr. and Mrs. Hammond , was merely voidable and not void , and ( ii ) that the registered holders of the charge were bona fide mortgagees for value without notice of the facts giving rise to voidability , then wrongly exercised his discretion to refuse to rectify since the considerations in favour of rectification could hardly have been stronger and his refusal to exercise his discretion was tantamount to denying the effective existence of such discretion , as if it was not exercised on the facts of this case it could never , or virtually never , be exercised at all ; and that , in the premises , the judge had erred in law in placing excessive reliance upon ( i ) and ( ii ) above to the exclusion of the other considerations which favoured rectification . |
| 28 | By a notice of appeal dated 1 July 1992 M. appealed on the ground that at no time had he been personally served with either the committal order or a copy and that accordingly the order should be set aside . |
| 29 | By a notice of appeal dated 1 June 1992 W. appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) the High Court had no jurisdiction , or alternatively no jurisdiction should be exercised , to overrule the refusal of a competent minor aged 16 to undergo medical treatment ; ( 2 ) section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 should have been applied ; ( 3 ) the judge had erred in applying observations of Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. in In re R. ( A Minor ) ( Wardship : Consent to Treatment ) [ 1992 ] Fam. 11 which were erroneous ; ( 4 ) the judge had wrongly found that in respect of the Children Act 1989 the minor 's right of refusal was limited to the stage of assessment ; and ( 5 ) the judge had failed to have sufficient regard to the medical evidence against transferring W. , to the advantages of not moving her and to her wishes and his decision was plainly wrong . |
| 30 | By a notice of appeal dated 18 February 1991 the second defendant appealed on the grounds , inter alia , that the judge erred ( 1 ) in concluding that the first defendant was not acting as the plaintiffs ' agent when he procured the signature of the second defendant to the legal charge dated 3 July 1987 ; and ( 2 ) in not finding that the execution of the charge was procured by the undue influence and material misrepresentation of the first defendant and thereby in not setting aside the charge . |