Example sentences of "7(5) of [art] " in BNC.

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1 So article 7(5) of the Leasing Convention , which provides that nothing in article 7 is to affect the priority of any lien creditor , does not mean that lien creditors are to have priority over the lessor , merely that article 7 itself is not to be treated as dealing with the issue , so that resort must be had to the applicable law .
2 She was advised that formal evidence would have to be called in order for her to form an opinion under section 7(5) of the Act of 1976 as to whether the defendant should be remanded in custody or on bail on the same or more stringent conditions , and that accordingly the hearing would in effect be a trial and would require to be heard before at least two justices .
3 Held , allowing the application , that since section 7(5) of the Act of 1976 made provision for persons arrested for breaking bail conditions , or on the likelihood of their so doing , to be brought before a single justice , it was an enactment falling within the exception contemplated by section 121 of the Act of 1980 which , in any event , was limited to summary trials of informations and the hearing of complaints under the civil jurisdiction ; that Parliament had intended by section 7(4) to create a simple and expeditious procedure whereby a justice was required , before forming an opinion under section 7(5) , to conduct no more than an informal inquiry , hearing the arresting officer 's grounds for belief that the person had broken or might break his bail conditions and allowing that person to respond , but without the giving of evidence on oath or cross-examination ; and that , since the provisions of the Act of 1980 relating to the adjournment of proceedings before magistrates ' courts did not apply , there was no power in the justice to adjourn proceedings under section 7(5) ( post , pp. 24A , G — 25B , C–G , 26B , E–F , H — 27A , G–H ) .
4 By notice of motion dated 14 May 1990 the Director of Public Prosecutions sought judicial review of ( 1 ) the decision of a single justice sitting at the Liverpool Magistrates ' Court on 16 February 1990 declining to proceed under section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 in respect of John James Bell , who had been arrested pursuant to section 7(3) of the Act , until such time as the bench was composed of at least two justices ; ( 2 ) her decision adjourning the proceedings to a court sitting on 19 February 1990 for evidence to be called and until such time remanding the defendant in custody ; and ( 3 ) the decision on 19 February 1990 of the justices before whom the adjourned decision came declining jurisdiction to hear the section 7(5) proceedings .
5 In giving that advice , Mr. Workman relied upon footnote ( e ) to section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 in Stone 's Justices ' Manual , 121st ed. ( 1989 ) , vol. 1 , p. 128 , para. 1–476 , which states :
6 He submitted that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter because the terms of section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 empower a justice of the peace to remand a person in custody only if the justice is of the opinion that , inter alia , he has broken a condition of his bail ; otherwise , if not of that opinion , the court must grant bail on the same conditions as were originally imposed .
7 As the court on 16 February had remanded Mr. Bell in custody without forming that opinion , the remand was unlawful and the court as constituted on 19 February did not fall within the terms of section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 .
8 She goes on to say that the justices came to the view that the justice on the Friday had had no power to remand Mr. Bell in custody until the Monday , as the remand did not fall within the terms of section 7(5) of the Act of 1976 and that , accordingly , they no longer had any jurisdiction to hear the matter .
9 The first question is whether the procedure under section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 is a matter which calls for a formal hearing by a court consisting of at least two justices .
10 There are , in my opinion , two reasons why a proceeding under section 7(5) of the Act of 1976 does not require a court of two justices .
11 The second reason why two justices were not required was that the proceeding under section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 was neither the trial of an information summarily nor the hearing of a complaint within the meaning of section 121(1) of the Magistrates ' Courts Act 1980 .
12 The third and final question is whether the justice had power to adjourn the proceeding before her under section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 to the following Monday .
13 Even if the matter were still proceeding before the justices ' court , either for the purposes of committal for trial or for trial of an information , it would be my opinion that neither section 5(1) nor section 10(1) of the Act of 1980 would apply to give the justice hearing a proceeding under section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 a power to adjourn that proceeding .
14 Further , the terms of section 7(5) of the Act of 1976 are clear and they are mandatory in form , to the extent that if the justice is not of the opinion that the person is not likely to surrender to custody , or has broken or is likely to break any condition of his bail , the justice has to grant him bail subject to the same conditions , if any , as were originally imposed .
15 First , it does no violence to the language either of sections 5(1) and 10(1) of the Act of 1980 , or to the language of section 7(5) of the Bail Act 1976 .
16 For those reasons , I would declare that it was within the power of the single justice ; indeed , it was her duty on the Friday to complete the proceeding under section 7(5) of the Act of 1976 , and that it was unlawful for her to adjourn the matter to the following Monday , she having no power to do so , and that the decision of the justices on the Monday was correct .
17 Section 7(5) of the act should be strengthened to put the hospital managers on a par with the local social services authority .
18 Article 7(5) of the High Court and County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1991 sets out the criteria to be considered when deciding whether or not to make an order for transfer in a case in which both the High Court and the County Court have mutual jurisdiction .
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