Example sentences of "to have regard to " in BNC.

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1 The four will have to have regard to the ‘ interest of justice ’ objective .
2 When determining planning applications planning authorities are required to have regard to structure and local plans .
3 ‘ Amenity ’ is not limited to ‘ present amenity ’ , therefore an authority is quite entitled to have regard to future detriment .
4 An accurate account would have to have regard to all those instances where a remedy has been accorded by a state party simply to forestall a successful application and to those cases , also , where breach had been avoided in the first place by reason of adjustment of procedures so as to ensure compliance with the Convention .
5 It would only be right to have regard to facilities if there are objective grounds for believing that the lender will fulfil his commitment .
6 For example , the Social Security Commissioners will regard a failure to have regard to the principles of natural justice as an error of law which can form the basis of an appeal to them .
7 Professional bodies are to be placed under a statutory duty to have regard to advice from the Advisory Committee in preparing rules of competence and conduct for their own members .
8 The court will be permitted to have regard to any matters it thinks fit including :
9 The court had to have regard to the ascertainable defect in the mentality of the defendant , and whether it showed a predilection to do harm to others .
10 Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 , s.43(1A) required the court to have regard to the value of the property concerned and the likely financial effect of the order on the offender , taken together with any other order which the court contemplates making .
11 Highbury Corner Stipendiary Magistrate ex p. di Matteo established that before making an order depriving an offender of his rights in property under Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 , s.43 , the court must have some evidence of the value of the property concerned ( also in that case a car ) so that it can fulfil the obligation imposed by section 43(1A) to have regard to the value of the property concerned .
12 Since Morland J. found that the cases mentioned above demonstrated , without uncertainty or ambiguity , that the council as a local authority was entitled to sue for damages in respect of the libels alleged in the statement of claim , he held that it was not necessary to have regard to article 10 .
13 A failure on the part — ( a ) of a police officer to comply with any provision of such a code ; or ( b ) of any person other than a police officer who is charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders to have regard to any relevant provision of such a code in the discharge of that duty , shall not of itself render him liable to any criminal or civil proceedings .
14 ( 2 ) Whereas it has been axiomatic throughout the working lifetimes of many now engaged in the administration of criminal justice that a police officer should never , save in exceptional circumstances , even address questions to a suspect after he has been charged , the Serious Fraud Office , which is by statute required to have regard to Code C , is asserting a contradictory power not only to ask questions at such a time , but also to penalise the applicant for any failure to reply .
15 When justices are advised not to have regard to statements of evidence and to medical reports on that ground they are being deprived of potentially valuable material in these difficult cases and I wish to make it clear that hearsay evidence is available to assist the court in all these cases although its weight will always be a matter for the judgment of the court .
16 Section 25 of the Act of 1989 requires the court considering the application for a secure accommodation order to have regard to a number of crucial matters .
17 Although section 76 of the Education Act 1944 imposed on the local education authority and the Secretary of State ( not the governors ) the duty to have regard to ‘ the general principle that … pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents , ’ the first positive duty to give effect to such wishes was contained in section 6 of the Act of 1980 .
18 Mr. Howell then argues backwards from this that if a school is over-subscribed so that section 6(3) ( a ) is in point , there is a duty not to have regard to preserving the school 's character in deciding priorities because the only permissible way of taking that into account is by section 6(3) ( b ) .
19 The local authority appealed against the orders and sought an interim care order on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had erred in law when they had made the order preventing the parents from having contact with each other as contact between adults was not a step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his responsibilities towards his child and thus fell outside the terms of section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989 ; ( 2 ) there had been no application for a section 8 order and before exercising powers under section 10(1) ( b ) of the Act of 1989 the justices should have invited the parties to make representations , and the failure to do so was a material irregularity ; ( 3 ) the justices , having found as a fact that the parents had been in continuous contact and there were grounds for believing that the children would suffer harm , had been plainly wrong in refusing to make the interim care order in respect of both children in that they had failed to have regard to the facts that both parents had colluded over injuries to D. , the mother had lied when she had stated that there had been no contact with the father , the father had been in breach of a bail order there had been a violent incident on 23 November 1991 which had involved both parents , the mother had refused to be accommodated with the children in a mother and baby home , and the mother had changed her mind about the adoption of R. ; and ( 4 ) in all the circumstances the order which would have been in the best interests of the children and which the justices should have made was an interim care order .
20 It is further urged upon me that the justices , having found as a fact that the parents had been in continuous contact with each other , and the justices being satisfied that there were grounds for believing that both the children were likely to suffer significant harm , which was a specific finding that they made , they were plainly wrong in refusing to make an interim order in that they first of all failed to have regard to the fact that the parents had colluded over the cause of D. 's injuries , and there was evidence to that effect ; secondly , that the mother had lied to social services , Dr. Barnardo 's and the guardian about having had at the relevant times no contact with the father — and that is indeed what the mother has done , she has lied ; and , thirdly , that the father had been in breach of a term of the bail conditions which had been imposed upon him , not only on 23 December 1991 but ever since his release in as much as he had visited and contacted the mother .
21 They failed also , it is said , to have regard to the violent incident on 23 November 1991 when violence was used and also failed to have regard to the fact that the mother had refused an offer to be accommodated with her children in the foster home .
22 They failed also , it is said , to have regard to the violent incident on 23 November 1991 when violence was used and also failed to have regard to the fact that the mother had refused an offer to be accommodated with her children in the foster home .
23 There is a further submission that they failed to have regard to the mother changing her mind about having R. adopted .
24 However , before considering whether your Lordships should proceed in that direction , it is first necessary to have regard to the impact of any relevant statutory provisions governing the repayment of overpaid tax by the revenue to the taxpayer .
25 But even in the case of such an Act , if there are superadded provisions which attach to non-payment consequences other than a bare liability to be sued , there can be no justification for refusing to have regard to those consequences and to consider whether the existence of the provisions creating them has placed the payer under such pressure that the payments have not in truth been voluntary .
26 I repeat that they are part of a dissenting judgment but if one is to consider what principle of law is to be applied in an area where there is no direct authority of your Lordships ' House , it is relevant to have regard to them .
27 By section 1(3) of the Act of 1989 Parliament has required a court exercising this jurisdiction to have regard to a number of considerations and by subsection ( 5 ) has directed the court to make no order , notwithstanding an agreement between the parties , unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all .
28 I raised with counsel the question whether , on an appeal such as this , it was appropriate or permissible for me to have regard to those additional findings and reasons .
29 By notice of appeal dated 22 April 1992 the father appealed on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the judge was wrong in law to reject the submission that any consideration of the children 's welfare in the context of a judicial discretion under article 13 ( a ) of the Convention was relevant only as a material factor if it met the test of placing the children in an ‘ intolerable situation ’ under article 13 ( b ) ; ( 2 ) the judge should have limited considerations of welfare to the criteria for welfare laid down by the Convention itself ; ( 3 ) the judge was wrong in law to reject the submission that in the context of the exercise of the discretion permitted by article 13 ( a ) the court was limited to a consideration of the nature and quality of the father 's acquiescence ( as found by the Court of Appeal ) ; ( 4 ) in the premises , despite her acknowledgment that the exercise of her discretion had to be seen in the context of the Convention , the judge exercised a discretion based on a welfare test appropriate to wardship proceedings ; ( 5 ) the judge was further in error as a matter of law in not perceiving as the starting point for the exercise of her discretion the proposition that under the Convention the future of the children should be decided in the courts of the state from which they had been wrongfully removed ; ( 6 ) the judge , having found that on the ability to determine the issue between the parents there was little to choose between the Family Court of Australia and the High Court of England , was wrong not to conclude that as a consequence the mother had failed to displace the fundamental premise of the Convention that the future of the children should be decided in the courts of the country from which they had been wrongfully removed ; ( 7 ) the judge also misdirected herself when considering which court should decide the future of the children ( a ) by applying considerations more appropriate to the doctrine of forum conveniens and ( b ) by having regard to the likely outcome of the hearing in that court contrary to the principles set out in In re F. ( A Minor ) ( Abduction : Custody Rights ) [ 1991 ] Fam. 25 ; ( 8 ) in the alternative , if the judge was right to apply the forum conveniens approach , she failed to have regard to the following facts and matters : ( a ) that the parties were married in Australia ; ( b ) that the parties had spent the majority of their married life in Australia ; ( c ) that the children were born in Australia and were Australian citizens ; ( d ) that the children had spent the majority of their lives in Australia ; ( e ) the matters referred to in ground ( 9 ) ; ( 9 ) in any event on the facts the judge was wrong to find that there was little to choose between the Family Court of Australia and the High Court of England as fora for deciding the children 's future ; ( 11 ) the judge was wrong on the facts to find that there had been a change in the circumstances to which the mother would be returning in Australia given the findings made by Thorpe J. that ( a ) the former matrimonial home was to be sold ; ( b ) it would be unavailable for occupation by the mother and the children after 7 February 1992 ; and ( c ) there would be no financial support for the mother other than state benefits : matters which neither Thorpe J. nor the Court of Appeal found amounted to ‘ an intolerable situation . ’
30 I accept [ counsel 's ] submission that it is relevant for this court to have regard to the fact that in Australia there is no longer any home or any financial support for the mother and for the boys , a situation for which the mother bears no greater responsibility than the father .
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