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Example sentences of "from section [no cls] " in BNC.

No	Sentence
1	By a notice of appeal dated 6 September 1991 the solicitors appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) the judge was wrong in law in holding that ( a ) under section 6(2) of the Act of 1986 the court had jurisdiction to order any person other than the contravener who appeared to the court to have been knowingly concerned in the contravention of section 3 of the Act to repay to investors sums paid by them to Pantell and ( b ) under section 61(1) of the Act the court had jurisdiction to order any person other than the contravener who appeared to the court to have been knowingly concerned in the contravention of any rules , regulations or provisions referred to in that section to repay to investors sums paid by them to Pantell ; ( 2 ) the court had no jurisdiction under sections 6(2) and 61(1) to award claims for compensation for loss against persons knowingly concerned in such contraventions in contrast to sections 6(3) to ( 7 ) and sections 61(3) to ( 7 ) ; ( 3 ) the judge was wrong in law in holding that ( a ) the power of the court under section 6(2) to order a person knowingly concerned in the contravention to take such steps as the court might direct for restoring the parties to the transaction to the position in which they were before the transaction was entered into and ( b ) the power of the court under section 61(1) to order a person knowingly concerned in the contravention of the rules , regulations or provisions referred to in that section to take such steps as the court might direct to remedy it included power to make a financial award against such person directing payment by that person to individual investors of sums equivalent to the amounts paid by such investors pursuant to the said transaction , neither subsection empowering the court to order restitution by the repayment of moneys outside the possession or control of the person concerned ; and ( 4 ) the judge erred in law ( a ) in his construction of sections 6(2) and 61(1) in failing to have regard to the principle ‘ generalibus specialia derogant , ’ in particular in holding that there could exist within each of sections 6 and 61 two parallel powers to order financial redress at the suit of the plaintiff , one derived from sections 6(3) and 6(4) and sections 61(3) and 61(4) respectively , which was subject to the limitations set out in those and subsequent subsections , and the other derived from section 6(2) and section 61(1) , which was subject to no such limitations ; ( b ) in rejecting the submission that sections 6 and 61 were essentially procedural and did not create new substantive legal rights and remedies ; and ( c ) in failing to have regard to the fact that the orders sought under paragraphs 11 and 13 of the prayer to the amended statement of claim required payment to the plaintiff or alternatively into court of moneys recovered thereunder from the solicitors despite the absence of any provisions for such orders in the Act , his dismissal of the summons being inconsistent with his finding that there was no provision in sections 6(2) or 61(1) directing payment into court and that any order under the sections would have to direct repayment of the sum paid to each individual investor who had made the original payment .
2	I wish only to add that in my judgment I have , after some hesitation , come to the conclusion that it is impossible to extract a general discretion to rectify the register from section 82(1) ( h ) of the Land Registration Act 1925 beyond that necessary to cover some unusual error which did not fall under paragraphs ( d ) to ( g ) .
3	It might appear from section 8(2) that , if no price is agreed and there is no method of ascertaining it , a reasonable price is automatically payable .
4	It is hoped that a double credit unit currently being developed , Introduction to Quality Assurance , will give similar exemption from Section A4 of the syllabus .
5	It 's just er a small section of foot of a footnote which gives an account of the history of the clause in er of the section in the er Police Act of nineteen sixty four with which we are dealing and of course Your Lordships will be well aware that we moved on from Section er from the Sections of the Police Act , we 're not dealing with them at all , we 're dealing with what has happened to those Clauses since and I thought perhaps Your Lordship might Your Lordships might be interested in the sort of guidance which is made available th so , so fortunately to us and so that we can have our minds very clearly focused upon the issues .
6	’ The entitlement to recover their expenses for doing the work derived , at the relevant time , from section 10(3) of the Act which provided , so far as is relevant :
7	In this case only south-west , west and northwest winds would be onshore , so that it would be better to derive a resultant of onshore winds from section ABCD of Fig. 8.24A .
8	By a notice of appeal dated 24 December 1991 the local authority appealed with leave of the judge on the grounds that ( 1 ) the judge had erred in law or misdirected himself as to the criteria to be applied to the decision whether leave should be granted in respect of an application by a former foster parent ; ( 2 ) the judge should have applied the test whether ( a ) there were quite exceptional circumstances disclosed necessitating the ousting of the local authority and the consequent discharge of the care order , and ( b ) there was a real likelihood that the applicant could persuade the court to adopt that course and ( c ) such a course was in the interests of the children ; ( 3 ) alternatively , if the judge had adopted the correct test , his exercise of his discretion had been plainly wrong in that he had failed to give any or sufficient weight to ( a ) the disturbing effects on the children of further investigation , ( b ) the fact that if residence orders were made the care order would be discharged , ( c ) the shared responsibility between the foster mother and the mother resulting from section 12(2) of the Act of 1989 , ( d ) the fact that the foster mother 's proper remedy was her application for judicial review , and ( e ) the wishes of the children and the mother .
9	He then went on to consider whether the further proceedings would be against the children 's interests under four heads : ( 1 ) the disturbing effects on the children of further investigation ; ( 2 ) the fact that , under section 91(1) , if in respect of any child a residence order were made in favour of the foster mother , the existing care order to the local authority would be discharged ; ( 3 ) the shared parental responsibility between the foster mother and the mother which would result from section 12(2) conferring parental responsibility upon the foster mother if a residence order were to be made in her favour ; ( 4 ) the time that would be likely to elapse before any substantive order could be made .
10	By a notice of appeal dated 6 September 1991 the solicitors appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) the judge was wrong in law in holding that ( a ) under section 6(2) of the Act of 1986 the court had jurisdiction to order any person other than the contravener who appeared to the court to have been knowingly concerned in the contravention of section 3 of the Act to repay to investors sums paid by them to Pantell and ( b ) under section 61(1) of the Act the court had jurisdiction to order any person other than the contravener who appeared to the court to have been knowingly concerned in the contravention of any rules , regulations or provisions referred to in that section to repay to investors sums paid by them to Pantell ; ( 2 ) the court had no jurisdiction under sections 6(2) and 61(1) to award claims for compensation for loss against persons knowingly concerned in such contraventions in contrast to sections 6(3) to ( 7 ) and sections 61(3) to ( 7 ) ; ( 3 ) the judge was wrong in law in holding that ( a ) the power of the court under section 6(2) to order a person knowingly concerned in the contravention to take such steps as the court might direct for restoring the parties to the transaction to the position in which they were before the transaction was entered into and ( b ) the power of the court under section 61(1) to order a person knowingly concerned in the contravention of the rules , regulations or provisions referred to in that section to take such steps as the court might direct to remedy it included power to make a financial award against such person directing payment by that person to individual investors of sums equivalent to the amounts paid by such investors pursuant to the said transaction , neither subsection empowering the court to order restitution by the repayment of moneys outside the possession or control of the person concerned ; and ( 4 ) the judge erred in law ( a ) in his construction of sections 6(2) and 61(1) in failing to have regard to the principle ‘ generalibus specialia derogant , ’ in particular in holding that there could exist within each of sections 6 and 61 two parallel powers to order financial redress at the suit of the plaintiff , one derived from sections 6(3) and 6(4) and sections 61(3) and 61(4) respectively , which was subject to the limitations set out in those and subsequent subsections , and the other derived from section 6(2) and section 61(1) , which was subject to no such limitations ; ( b ) in rejecting the submission that sections 6 and 61 were essentially procedural and did not create new substantive legal rights and remedies ; and ( c ) in failing to have regard to the fact that the orders sought under paragraphs 11 and 13 of the prayer to the amended statement of claim required payment to the plaintiff or alternatively into court of moneys recovered thereunder from the solicitors despite the absence of any provisions for such orders in the Act , his dismissal of the summons being inconsistent with his finding that there was no provision in sections 6(2) or 61(1) directing payment into court and that any order under the sections would have to direct repayment of the sum paid to each individual investor who had made the original payment .
11	Someone who buys goods having more than one common use or who wants goods for an abnormal purpose will not benefit from section 14(3) unless the seller was expressly informed of the particular purpose for which they were required .
12	What is important is the unequivocal , but in my respectful opinion wrong , statement of the law made by Viscount Dilhorne , at p. 632a ( to which I referred at the outset of my speech ) , that Parliament by omitting the words ‘ without the consent of the owner ’ from section 1(1) of the Act of 1968 ‘ has relieved the prosecution of the burden of establishing that the taking was without the owner 's consent . ’
13	If my submissions are correct , the question finally remains whether your Lordships are bound by the doctrine of precedent to follow and apply the statements in Reg. v. Lawrence [ 1972 ] A.C. 626 , 632 that Parliament , by omitting the words ‘ without the consent of the owner ’ from section 1(1) of the Act of 1968 , has ‘ relieved the prosecution of the burden of establishing that the taking was without the owner 's consent ’ and that ‘ [ appropriation ] may occur even though the owner has permitted or consented to the property being taken . ’
14	The Institute of Quality Assurance has recently confirmed that holders of the new Higher National Unit , Quality Assurance Management will be exempt from Section A3 of the Institute 's syllabus .
15	Section 6(3) ( a ) is quite distinct from section 6(3) ( b ) .