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Example sentences of "[noun sg] appealed on the " in BNC.

No	Sentence
1	The first defendant appealed on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the deputy judge had been wrong in law in holding that for the substituted section 9 ( b ) of the Wills Act 1837 to be satisfied the testator had to make his signature after making the dispositive provisions ; and ( 2 ) there was no sufficient evidence upon which the deputy judge could have found that the testator had not been of testamentary capacity at the time he had made and signed the alleged codicil on 18 April 1986 .
2	By a notice of appeal dated 18 February 1991 the second defendant appealed on the grounds , inter alia , that the judge erred ( 1 ) in concluding that the first defendant was not acting as the plaintiffs ' agent when he procured the signature of the second defendant to the legal charge dated 3 July 1987 ; and ( 2 ) in not finding that the execution of the charge was procured by the undue influence and material misrepresentation of the first defendant and thereby in not setting aside the charge .
3	By a notice of appeal dated 1 March 1991 the defendant appealed on the grounds , inter alia , ( 1 ) that the donee of the power of appointment , the defendant 's mother , Mrs. Mary Steed , did not know that she had been appointed attorney by the defendant and accordingly could not have known that she had any power to deal with his property when she executed the transfer of 4 September 1979 , and that in those circumstances the plea of non est factum ought to have succeeded on the judge 's finding that the donee was tricked into signing the transfer ; ( 2 ) the judge having rightly concluded that the transaction as affected was not a sale , save possibly at such a gross undervalue as to vitiate it as a sale , should therefore have held that the transfer was void and ineffective ; ( 3 ) the judge having rightly concluded that he retained a discretion to rectify the charges register against the registered holder , notwithstanding , as he found , that ( i ) the title of the mortgagors , Mr. and Mrs. Hammond , was merely voidable and not void , and ( ii ) that the registered holders of the charge were bona fide mortgagees for value without notice of the facts giving rise to voidability , then wrongly exercised his discretion to refuse to rectify since the considerations in favour of rectification could hardly have been stronger and his refusal to exercise his discretion was tantamount to denying the effective existence of such discretion , as if it was not exercised on the facts of this case it could never , or virtually never , be exercised at all ; and that , in the premises , the judge had erred in law in placing excessive reliance upon ( i ) and ( ii ) above to the exclusion of the other considerations which favoured rectification .
4	By a notice of appeal dated 13 January 1992 the council appealed on the grounds that the assistant recorder ( 1 ) misdirected himself in holding that the question of suitability of given future accommodation for the purpose of sections 65 and 69 was one of fact and fell to be determined by the county court in proceedings for breach of statutory duty , and ( 2 ) ought to have held that the plaintiff should have proceeded by way of an application for judicial review .
5	By a notice of appeal dated 25 November 1991 , and pursuant to the grant of leave to appeal out of time , the plaintiff appealed on the grounds that the judge erred in law in holding that ( 1 ) the defendant was at 24 December 1989 a residential occupier within the meaning of section 27 of the Housing Act 1988 and a statutory tenant within section 2 of the Rent Act 1977 ; and ( 2 ) once a possession order had been obtained against a statutory tenant it was necessary for the landlord to obtain a warrant of possession .
6	By a notice of appeal dated 7 July 1992 the husband appealed on the ground that a copy of the committal order had not been served on him either before or at the time of the execution of the warrant as required by Ord. 29 , r. 1(5) ( a ) of the County Court Rules 1981 ( as amended ) and that in consequence the order was invalid and/or defective and should be set aside .
7	The landlord appealed on the ground that he had reinstated the tenant in the flat , thus affording himself a defence under the 1988 Act , and that the award was too high .
8	By a notice of appeal dated 23 March 1992 the father appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) the judge had been wrong to conclude that he had no jurisdiction to make the orders sought and ( 2 ) having found that A. had been removed from his home with the father the judge had failed to order his return whether pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 or otherwise .
9	By notice of appeal dated 22 April 1992 the father appealed on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the judge was wrong in law to reject the submission that any consideration of the children 's welfare in the context of a judicial discretion under article 13 ( a ) of the Convention was relevant only as a material factor if it met the test of placing the children in an ‘ intolerable situation ’ under article 13 ( b ) ; ( 2 ) the judge should have limited considerations of welfare to the criteria for welfare laid down by the Convention itself ; ( 3 ) the judge was wrong in law to reject the submission that in the context of the exercise of the discretion permitted by article 13 ( a ) the court was limited to a consideration of the nature and quality of the father 's acquiescence ( as found by the Court of Appeal ) ; ( 4 ) in the premises , despite her acknowledgment that the exercise of her discretion had to be seen in the context of the Convention , the judge exercised a discretion based on a welfare test appropriate to wardship proceedings ; ( 5 ) the judge was further in error as a matter of law in not perceiving as the starting point for the exercise of her discretion the proposition that under the Convention the future of the children should be decided in the courts of the state from which they had been wrongfully removed ; ( 6 ) the judge , having found that on the ability to determine the issue between the parents there was little to choose between the Family Court of Australia and the High Court of England , was wrong not to conclude that as a consequence the mother had failed to displace the fundamental premise of the Convention that the future of the children should be decided in the courts of the country from which they had been wrongfully removed ; ( 7 ) the judge also misdirected herself when considering which court should decide the future of the children ( a ) by applying considerations more appropriate to the doctrine of forum conveniens and ( b ) by having regard to the likely outcome of the hearing in that court contrary to the principles set out in In re F. ( A Minor ) ( Abduction : Custody Rights ) [ 1991 ] Fam. 25 ; ( 8 ) in the alternative , if the judge was right to apply the forum conveniens approach , she failed to have regard to the following facts and matters : ( a ) that the parties were married in Australia ; ( b ) that the parties had spent the majority of their married life in Australia ; ( c ) that the children were born in Australia and were Australian citizens ; ( d ) that the children had spent the majority of their lives in Australia ; ( e ) the matters referred to in ground ( 9 ) ; ( 9 ) in any event on the facts the judge was wrong to find that there was little to choose between the Family Court of Australia and the High Court of England as fora for deciding the children 's future ; ( 11 ) the judge was wrong on the facts to find that there had been a change in the circumstances to which the mother would be returning in Australia given the findings made by Thorpe J. that ( a ) the former matrimonial home was to be sold ; ( b ) it would be unavailable for occupation by the mother and the children after 7 February 1992 ; and ( c ) there would be no financial support for the mother other than state benefits : matters which neither Thorpe J. nor the Court of Appeal found amounted to ‘ an intolerable situation . ’
10	By notice of appeal dated 25 February 1991 the local authority appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) the judge was wrong in law in holding that the cause of action accrued under section 10 of the Housing Act 1957 when the works were completed ; and ( 2 ) the judge ought to have held that on the true construction of , inter alia , section 10 the cause of action arose when the demands for payment were served or , alternatively , when the demands became operative following the determination of any appeal .
11	By a notice of appeal dated 20 May 1992 the health authority appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) the court had no jurisdiction to grant a mandatory injunction requiring a health authority to cause specified medical treatment to be given , alternatively , no jurisdiction to order it to cause such treatment to be given against the professional judgment of its servants or agents ; ( 2 ) the judge had erred in holding that he was not bound by the decision in In re J. ( A Minor ) ( Wardship : Medical Treatment ) [ 1991 ] Fam. 33 to hold that there was no such jurisdiction ; ( 3 ) there had been no material before the court to justify the judge granting a mandatory interlocutory injunction since ( a ) there was no evidence that the health authority owed J. any enforceable duty to provide the ordered treatment , or that such treatment would be in his best interests ; ( b ) there was uncontradicted evidence before the court that the treatment ordered would be painful and ineffective to give J. a prospect of long term survival and ( c ) there was no material establishing that there was a reasonable or any prospect of a final order being granted in the terms of the interlocutory order ; ( 4 ) if the court had jurisdiction to make the order the judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in that ( a ) he had failed to give sufficient weight to the uncontradicted medical evidence or to the undesirability of seeking to force a doctor to act against his professional judgment and/or requiring the employer of the doctor to do so , ( b ) he had failed to consider that the order was capable of interfering with the health authority 's duty to care for other patients , and ( c ) by its terms the order was too imprecise to enable the health authority to be able to ascertain how it should be complied with .
12	By a notice of appeal dated 29 November 1991 the debtor appealed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to make the bankruptcy order because she had not carried on business in England or Wales within three years prior to the presentation of the petition .
13	The appellant appealed on the ground that the co-defendant 's plea of guilty should have been excluded by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion under section 78(1) of the 1984 Act .
14	By a notice of appeal dated 23 April 1992 the Treasury Solicitor appealed on the grounds that ( 1 ) on a true construction of the Evidence ( Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions ) Act 1975 the court was precluded from making the order for examination ; ( 2 ) the deputy judge had erred in law in making the order and in holding that ( i ) it was possible to interpret section 9(4) of the Act so as not to preclude the order sought , ( ii ) the exclusion contained in section 9(4) was restricted to cases where the actual capacity in which the witness was called on to give evidence was a Crown capacity and that the fact that the evidence sought was acquired in the course of the witness 's employment as a servant of the Crown was not of itself sufficient to bring the case within the exclusion , ( iii ) the fact that the witness was now retired from his position was relevant to the question whether the exclusion in section 9(4) applied , ( iv ) if some other interpretation were possible , it would be unacceptable to approach section 9(4) as requiring the court to refuse to make the order that a witness who was competent and compellable within the United Kingdom should give evidence for foreign proceedings , ( v ) there was nothing in the material sought to be given in evidence which it could have been the policy or intention of the Act to have prevented being explored ; ( 3 ) the deputy judge had erred in law in approaching the question of capacity by concentrating on the position of the witness at the time that the evidence was to be given as opposed to the position of the witness at the time that he acquired the information which was the subject matter of the evidence and the nature content and source of such evidence ; ( 4 ) the judge had wrongly ignored the fact that the Crown as a party to the Hague Convention was in a position to give effect to it and to provide evidence to foreign courts in accordance with it without recourse to the court ; and ( 5 ) the judge had wrongly approached section 9(4) on the footing that it most likely addressed prejudice to the sovereignty of the state .
15	By a notice of appeal dated 20 July 1992 the Official Solicitor appealed on the grounds , inter alia , that since the judge had found as facts that ( a ) T. had been able properly and fully to form a balanced judgment and had not been acting under undue influence but had been acting voluntarily , and ( b ) her several expressions withholding consent were valid refusals which bound the hospital , ( 1 ) he had erred in finding himself entitled to make the declaration ; ( 2 ) it had been wrong for him to assess T. 's subsequent intentions and to make assumptions as to whether she would have qualified or changed her refusal in the later circumstances ; and ( 3 ) he had erred in finding that ( a ) there was no evidence that T. had wished to refuse a blood transfusion even though it was at risk to her life , ( b ) lack of understanding of the risks involved justified acting against her expressed refusal , ( c ) her withholding of consent did not embrace the emergency which had arisen and took no account of changed circumstances , ( d ) her expressed refusals did not evince a settled intention to persist in her refusal even if injurious to her health when her best interests required a transfusion ; and ( e ) he was not satisfied that her refusal was continuing .