Example sentences of "[art] plaintiffs [unc] " in BNC.

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1 But the principal credit goes to our legal team for identifying at the outset the essential weakness in the plaintiffs ' case .
2 The point was that the plaintiffs ' interest in Jarrad exceeded their interest in Jesner , and they contended that the object of Jarrad had been to provide money for the family and not to have its assets syphoned off to prop up Jesner .
3 A Federal judge refused the plaintiffs ' request for a restraining order to open the late April pre-session meeting , saying they failed to demonstrate that real deliberations and decision making were taking place .
4 It concluded that the preponderance of characteristics of the Trusteeship Agreement ( which formed the plaintiffs ' basic constitutional agreement ) suggested an intention to establish direct , affirmative , judicially enforceable rights .
5 I would allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiffs ' action .
6 My Lords , I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend , Lord Templeman , and for the reasons he gives I , too , would allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiffs ' action .
7 My Lords , for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend , Lord Templeman , I , too , would allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiffs ' action .
8 On the plaintiffs ' originating summons for a declaration that the ombudsman did not have jurisdiction to investigate and determine the borrowers ' complaints : —
9 The judge dismissed the action but the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs ' appeal and granted the declaration sought .
10 Held , allowing the appeal , that it was a requirement of all leases and tenancy agreements that the term created was of certain duration ; that the lease purportedly created under the memorandum of agreement , being for an uncertain period , was void and the land was held on a yearly tenancy created by virtue of the tenant 's possession and payment of yearly rent , on such terms of the memorandum of agreement as were consistent with a yearly tenancy ; and that , accordingly , since the term preventing the landlord from determining the tenancy until the land was required for road widening purposes was inconsistent with the right of either party under a yearly tenancy to determine it on six months ' notice , the plaintiffs ' tenancy had been lawfully determined ( post , pp. 283B–C , F–G , 284G–H , 285E–F , 286E–F , H — 287B , G–H ) .
11 The Crown Prosecution Service were informed of Buckley J. 's order and of the plaintiffs ' intention to appeal from the decision of Wright J. , and were asked whether they wished to intervene or make representations in the appeal .
12 The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiffs ' appeal from Wright J. 's order , holding that it was not open to the court to devise protection in substitution for the defendants ' privilege against self-incrimination , and that the plaintiffs ' claim was neither proprietary nor within section 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981
13 The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiffs ' appeal from Wright J. 's order , holding that it was not open to the court to devise protection in substitution for the defendants ' privilege against self-incrimination , and that the plaintiffs ' claim was neither proprietary nor within section 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981
14 On the plaintiffs ' appeal : —
15 The plaintiffs ' claim in these proceedings is based on allegations of a complicated fraud said to have been perpetrated by the first defendant Mr. Tully in conspiracy with his wife the second defendant , Mrs. Tully and with all or some of the other first 16 defendants .
16 Accordingly on 5 June 1991 Buckley J. made against various defendants orders for disclosure and discovery including an order in paragraph 18 that Mr. Tully should make and serve on the plaintiffs ' solicitors an affidavit :
17 The Court of Appeal reached their decision with regret because as they clearly saw Mr. Tully is seeking to exploit the privilege against self-incrimination in order to frustrate the plaintiffs ' claims .
18 I respectfully agree with his reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs ' claim for the inspection of documents and disclosure of information before trial based upon section 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 , upon the alleged proprietary claim and upon waiver .
19 The plaintiffs ' contentions under this heading do not seek to cut down or erode or encroach upon the privilege against self-incrimination .
20 In his judgment in the instant case Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. summarised the plaintiffs ' argument in this way [ 1992 ] 1 Q.B .
21 The terms in which it expressed this decision are to be found in a letter dated 23 October 1991 addressed to the plaintiffs ' solicitors and written by Mr. A. D. Farries , a principal in the Crown Prosecutor Fraud Investigation Group .
22 ‘ I am concerned that if I now have to respond fully to that part of the plaintiffs ' order of 5 June dealing with the various alleged payments my position vis-à-vis the police investigation may well be prejudiced .
23 The plaintiffs ' next contention has been described as the proprietary argument to the effect that Mr. and Mrs. Tully are constructive trustees for the plaintiffs of the moneys claimed in the action , that a court of equity will not hesitate to protect and preserve a trust fund in interlocutory proceedings on the principle that , if the trust fund disappears , it will turn out that equity has been invoked to no purpose and that a claim for privilege can not be successfully raised against an order which permits a plaintiff to search for and to seize his own property , including property which is in the possession of the defendant .
24 The fallacy in the plaintiffs ' argument lay in the assertion that the challenged paragraphs of the order of Buckley J. constituted a proprietary remedy and not a mere order for discovery .
25 And , while the general right of beneficiaries to inspect trust documents was recognised in In re Londonderry 's Settlement [ 1965 ] Ch. 918 as being a proprietary right , that case does not provide support for the plaintiffs ' contention in the instant appeal .
26 And that is just the kind of order , it seems to me , which ought to have been granted if the plaintiffs ' contentions are correct .
27 I now come to what I regard as the plaintiffs ' most convincing argument , namely , that paragraph 33 of Buckley J. 's order , combined with the letter dated 23 October 1991 from the Crown Prosecution Service , provides effective protection for the defendants against the criminal consequences of having to disclose incriminating information or documents by virtue of paragraphs 18(a) and ( c ) and 19(a) and ( c ) of the order .
28 In my judgment , he would inevitably have come to the conclusion , as a matter of necessary inference , that the plaintiffs were paying and the defendants accepting the money subject to repayment if the action resulted in the plaintiffs ' favour .
29 Walton J. did not purport to decide the case on the basis of a payment made under a mistake of law and I agree with the doubts expressed by Romer J. in Twyford v. Manchester Corporation [ 1946 ] Ch. 236 , 241 , as to this being a true case of money paid under a mistake of law having regard to the plaintiffs ' expressions as to their understanding of the law at the time of the payments .
30 It is enough if there be just and reasonable grounds for apprehending that unless payment be made an unlawful and injurious course will be taken by the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs ' actual rights .
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