Example sentences of "not a [noun] in [art] [noun] " in BNC.
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| 1 | It was the premium put upon child labour within the domestic family economy of textile manufacture which provides the context for Defoe 's observations of around 1720 on Norfolk that " the very children after four or five years of age , could earn their own bread " , while at Taunton " there was not a child in the town , or in the villages round it , of above five years old , but , if it was not neglected by its parents , and untaught , could earn its own bread " . |
| 2 | There is magnetism in romantic gestures that make you forget you 've been standing in the same place for half the day , that there is not a child in the house washed and you never got flowers from your 's truly . |
| 3 | God was not a word in a book or a gigantic figure in the sky . |
| 4 | I 'm not a brick in a wall . |
| 5 | There is not a school in the land that does n't teach mathematics and English . |
| 6 | ‘ Why not a drink in the bar at six-thirty ? ’ she suggested . |
| 7 | For if you were such a brain , then , provided that the scientist is successful , nothing in your experience could possibly reveal that you were ; for your experience is ex hypothesi identical with that of something which is not a brain in a vat . |
| 8 | Is it possible , however , that though you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat you still know many other things , perhaps more important ? |
| 9 | You presumably also know that if you are sitting reading , you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 10 | We can surely conclude that if you know that you are sitting reading , you know that you are not a brain in a vat , and hence ( by simple modus tollens ) that since you do n't know that you are not a brain in a vat ( agreed above ) you do n't know that you are sitting reading . |
| 11 | We can surely conclude that if you know that you are sitting reading , you know that you are not a brain in a vat , and hence ( by simple modus tollens ) that since you do n't know that you are not a brain in a vat ( agreed above ) you do n't know that you are sitting reading . |
| 12 | It seems therefore to show , more generally , that since you do n't know that you are not a brain in a vat you can not know any proposition p of which you know that if p were true , you would not be a brain in a vat . |
| 13 | In fact its grip is restricted entirely to those propositions whose truth would mean that you were not a brain in a vat . |
| 14 | All we need is to show that your belief that you are not a brain in a vat can not be justified since nothing in your experience can count as evidence for that proposition , and then appeal to an analogue of : which holds that if a is justified in believing that p and that p implies q , a is justified in believing that q . |
| 15 | Perhaps , however , we can make this claim by appeal to the initial moves of the argument that you are not justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 16 | There we claimed that if nothing in your experience could count as evidence that you were not a brain in a vat , your belief that you are not a brain in a vat can not be called justified . |
| 17 | There we claimed that if nothing in your experience could count as evidence that you were not a brain in a vat , your belief that you are not a brain in a vat can not be called justified . |
| 18 | The belief is unjustified because nothing that you can point to suggests that you are rather than are not a brain in a vat . |
| 19 | The conditional theory of knowledge can show that you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 20 | For a necessary condition for such knowledge , 3 ( that if it were not true that you are not a brain in a vat , you would not believe that you are not a brain in a vat ) fails . |
| 21 | For a necessary condition for such knowledge , 3 ( that if it were not true that you are not a brain in a vat , you would not believe that you are not a brain in a vat ) fails . |
| 22 | We can simplify this conditional as follows : if you were a brain in a vat , you would not believe that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 23 | This is false because if you were a brain in a vat ( being fed your current experiences ) , you would still believe that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 24 | Therefore , if the conditional theory of knowledge is on the right lines , you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 25 | First , it can reinforce our intuitions that you know that you are sitting reading etc. , that you know that if you are sitting reading etc. you are not a brain in a vat , and that you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 26 | First , it can reinforce our intuitions that you know that you are sitting reading etc. , that you know that if you are sitting reading etc. you are not a brain in a vat , and that you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 27 | However , you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat because it is not the case that ( 3 ) in the nearest worlds in which you are a brain in a vat you believe that you are a brain in a vat . |
| 28 | We already have such an example : the case where a = you , p = you are sitting reading , and q = you are not a brain in a vat . |
| 29 | Second , there is something right about an argument which holds , as does the argument from error , that for the very same sort of reason that you do n't know you are not a brain in a vat , you do n't know , e.g. , that The Times will be published tomorrow , nor whether you are sitting reading . |
| 30 | Nozick anyway could not hold that it does , because his position relies on the independent proof it provides that you do n't know you are not a brain in a vat . |