Example sentences of "appeal by the [noun pl] " in BNC.
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| 1 | The Court of Appeal allowed appeals by the accountants and the administrators against the orders of Morritt J. and Hoffmann J. respectively . |
| 2 | Huge queues formed despite radio appeals by the organisers for enthusiasts to stay away unless they had tickets . |
| 3 | These were consolidated appeals by the taxpayers , Mr. J. T. Hart , Mr. M. J. P. Knott , Mr. T. Southall , Mr. H. J. Campbell-Ferguson , Dr. D. M. Penter , Mr. B. B. White , Mr. J. P. Knee , Mr. W. J. Denny , Mr. A. J. Hunter and Mr. C. Nicholls ( since deceased ) , who were in 1983 all employed as members of the staff of Malvern College , from the judgment dated 13 November 1990 of the Court of Appeal ( Slade , Nicholls and Farquharson L.JJ. ) dismissing the appellants ' appeals from the judgment dated 24 November 1989 of Vinelott J. , who had allowed appeals by the Crown from a decision dated 10 August 1988 by a single special commissioner in favour of the taxpayers . |
| 4 | These were appeals by the applicants , Abdul Malik Choudhury and Nitya Ranjan Purkayastha , by leave of the Court of Appeal , from an order dated 6 November 1991 of that court ( Balcombe , Taylor and McCowan L.JJ. ) ( 1991 ) 90 L.G.R. 103 , allowing appeals by the respondents , The Bishop Challoner Roman Catholic Comprehensive Girls ' School ( ‘ the school ’ ) and the appeal committee of the school , against orders dated 31 July 1991 of Simon Brown J. |
| 5 | On appeals by the applicants : |
| 6 | These were appeals by the applicants , Abdul Malik Choudhury and Nitya Ranjan Purkayastha , by leave of the Court of Appeal , from an order dated 6 November 1991 of that court ( Balcombe , Taylor and McCowan L.JJ. ) ( 1991 ) 90 L.G.R. 103 , allowing appeals by the respondents , The Bishop Challoner Roman Catholic Comprehensive Girls ' School ( ‘ the school ’ ) and the appeal committee of the school , against orders dated 31 July 1991 of Simon Brown J. |
| 7 | On appeal by the solicitors : — |
| 8 | PETITION by the petitioner , Strathmore Group Ltd. , for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand ( Richardson , Hardie Boys and Gault JJ. ) given on 4 October 1991 allowing an appeal by the respondents , A. M. Fraser , C. Y. Todd and Durafort Investments Ltd. , from the judgment of Robertson J. in the High Court of New Zealand on 9 November 1990 , whereby he held that there had been no compromise which concluded all existing and future litigation between the parties ; and , as far as necessary , from the judgment of the Court of Appeal ( Cooke P. , Richardson and Hardie Boys JJ. ) given on 4 November 1991 dismissing the petitioner 's application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council . |
| 9 | dissenting ) allowing an appeal by the respondents , the Joint Administrators of British and Commonwealth Holdings Plc. , from the judgment and order dated 24 July 1991 of Hoffmann J. setting aside an order dated 29 April 1991 of Mr. Registrar Scott ordering production of certain documents by the appellants to the respondents pursuant to section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 . |
| 10 | On appeal by the taxpayers the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals . |
| 11 | On appeal by the taxpayers , the Appellate Committee having heard the appeal but before judgment referred it to an enlarged Appellate Committee to determine the question whether the existing exclusionary rule relating to the construction of statutes should be relaxed so as to enable Hansard to be consulted as an aid to construction : — |
| 12 | On appeal by the defendants : — |
| 13 | On appeal by the defendants , the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and discharged the injunction , holding that as a matter of domestic law there was no justification for extending to local authorities bringing proceedings under section 222 of the Act of 1972 to enforce the criminal law the privilege enjoyed by the Crown alone of being granted an interlocutory injunction without giving a cross-undertaking as to damages ; and that since it had not been established that the defendants had no defence under article 30 of the E.E.C . |
| 14 | APPEAL ( No. 6 of 1991 ) with leave of the Court of Appeal of Bermuda by the plaintiff , Horace Brenton Kelly , from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Bermuda ( Blair-Kerr P. , Roberts and Henry JJ.A. ) given on 30 November 1989 allowing an appeal by the defendants , Margot Cooper and Helen Cooper ( trading as Cooper Associates , a firm ) from the judgment of Hull J. delivered on 14 November 1988 in the Supreme Court of Bermuda ( Civil Jurisdiction ) , whereby he awarded the plaintiff $200,000 damages for breach of contract and made a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to commission on the sale of the plaintiff 's property , and the defendants ' counterclaim for commission was dismissed . |
| 15 | Mr Floyd has rejected an appeal by the Ramblers ' Association for an underpass or footbridge to be provided over the bypass where a footpath will be cut in two . |
| 16 | The reference to Murphy suggests that a sentence of four years would have been upheld on an appeal by the offenders . |
| 17 | On appeal by the accountants against the reversal of Hoffmann J. 's order : — |
| 18 | This was an appeal by the appellants , Spicer and Oppenheim , a firm of accountants , from the judgment of the Court of Appeal ( Ralph Gibson and Woolf L.JJ. , Nourse L.J . |
| 19 | On appeal by the applicants : — |
| 20 | On appeal by the plaintiffs : — |
| 21 | This was an appeal by the second to fourth defendants , Barron Investments Ltd. , Alan Moss Bayes and John Estelle Bayes , from the order of the Court of Appeal ( Parker , McCowan and Scott L.JJ. ) on 1 November 1991 allowing an appeal by the plaintiffs , the Prudential Assurance Co . |
| 22 | 315 dismissing an appeal by the plaintiffs from an order of Wright J. dated 20 August 1991 . |
| 23 | Mr replied that is what Mr was asking the other to do , that is to hold their hand and to enter into negotiations , now I fully appreciate that erm doctor feels strongly that the defendants have not been negotiating in good faith and have been simply dragging matters out for his benefit , now when I say that I 'm simply saying what I understand to be doctor view , I 'm certainly not suggesting that I 'm finding as a fact , but that was the decision , indeed I could n't cos I 've not heard all the evidence on this matter not as Mr to address me on that one , it seems to me with all respect to doctor missions on this matter that if there has been any dragging of feet or other improper conduct of either the defendants in connection with er they remain on in the premises and not paying what doctor would consider to be a full and proper rent or if there has been problem about their not disclosing documents when they should have done , the position is that doctor has er by making an appropriate application to the court , for maybe the appropriate relief arising out of the facts which he can establish , but that is not in general a matter which erm the court should go into on the question of taxation , it 's not , th this particular taxation of costs is a taxation as I understand it that are formally to the debt of the order of Mr Justice and there is thus no question of the court having to consider the question when the those tax those costs have been swollen or increased in any way by reason of spinning out negotiations whether to run up costs or otherwise , that simply does n't arising it seems to me in this case that maybe a matter which may arise possibly at some future date , though I would hope it would not do so , but er so far as the costs down to the end of the trial of the twentieth of March nineteen ninety one are concerned , it seems to me the fact that the parties maybe negotiating subsequently to deter to rece to resolve the outstanding issue , it 's not a matter which really goes to the question of erm what is the proper amount to allow for taxation of costs which have already been incurred , before these negotiations erm we do n't the figure of the costs appears to have been effectively agreed between the solicitors at forty two thousand pounds , the plaintiff solicitors made it quite clear that they were seeking interest , this was clear in apparently of nineteen ninety two , but this held their hand , er it seems to me the reason they held their hand rather than indicate it was because the defendant through his solicitor was asking them to do so and it seems to me that Mr was acting very sensibly in the defendants interest , because if in fact they had gone ahead and taxed their costs there and then the position would simply be that there would of been an award for taxation , in order , there would be a taxation resulting in an order for payment of of some cost probably in the region of forty two thousand pounds and er that order would itself carry interest under the judgements act , it does n't seem to me it can be sensibly said that erm any interest has to be in any way increased by reason of this delay and it seems to me that erm if one looks at order sixty two and twenty eight er certainly under paragraph B two erm there 's a reference there to any additional interest payable under section seventeen because of the failure on the May , erm , it does n't seem to me that the effect of what has in fact incurred , in this case has been , caused any additional interest to be paid and er it seems to me the only best that I can see in the evidence before me to , which would enable the court to erm , conclude that there should be a disallowance of interest would be as I say because the plaintiffs appear not to have perfected the order for the payment of perfectively two years , just over two years , erm it seems to me however that , that on balance probably it simply a matter of oversight and even if it had been perfected it would n't of made as I guess the least bit of difference to the way the negotiations er proceeded and accordingly I take the view that erm there are no grounds for disallowing interest from either the plaintiffs bill of costs or the defendants bill of costs , accordingly erm to allow the defendants appeal in preparation to the disallowance of costs er interest and to dismiss the defendants appeal for application in relation to an additional period , P sixty of course disallowed , I also propose to dismiss the sum of , the appeal by the plaintiffs from the refusal of taxing master to disallow the interest on the defendants bill of costs . |