Example sentences of "be for [art] court " in BNC.

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1 ‘ It is not … possible to generalise over the use of DNA analysis as the sole basis for conviction ; it will be for the court to decide in any particular case ’ .
2 The question of reasonableness would be for the court to decide .
3 The alternative would be for the Court of Appeal to decide all the matters before it .
4 In view of the conclusion which their Lordships have reached , namely , that the defendant 's conviction should be quashed and that it must be for the Court of Appeal in Jamaica to say whether a new trial should be ordered , their Lordships consider that it is unnecessary , and indeed undesirable in the interests of justice , to examine the rival contentions and the facts to which they relate with the same particularity as their Lordships would have felt bound to do if their recommendation had been in favour of dismissing the appeal .
5 It would be for the court to determine whether or not the accommodation was in fact suitable .
6 If a prosecution were brought it would be for the court to decide what the statements meant .
7 The only other alternative would be for the court to disregard one of the clauses and hold that one party had , by conduct , accepted the other party 's terms and waived its own , including the provision providing that it should not be taken as accepting any other terms .
8 Where clauses define the obligations undertaken under the contract , a party who performs in accordance with them is not in breach , and it is argued that the correct approach is for a court to interpret the contract as a whole , to identify extent of the obligations undertaken .
9 The alternative mode of procedure is for the court to make an order under Order 39 , rule 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court for the issue of a letter of request to the judicial authorities of the country in which the proposed witness is , asking that they take , or cause to be taken , the evidence of that person .
10 Once the discretion arises it is for the court to conduct the necessary balancing exercise between what would otherwise be required by the Convention and the interests of the children , but only where it can clearly be shown that the interests of the children require it should the court refuse to order their return .
11 Thus her conclusion that ‘ Once the discretion arises it is for the court to conduct the necessary balancing exercise between what would otherwise be required by the Convention and the interests of the children ’ is wrong in law and fatal to a proper exercise of a discretion under the Convention because it predicates that matters relating to the welfare of children falling outside the ambit of the criteria laid down by the Convention itself are relevant to the exercise of the discretion .
12 It is for the court to determine the true construction of a statute delineating that area .
13 Dealing firstly with the question of risk , it is our view that if the balance of medical evidence is that the deterioration will occur , then that is more than a risk and the appropriate course is for the Court to award damages on the basis that it is probable that the deterioration will occur .
14 In cases of doubt it is for the court to decide whether a witness is an expert or not after considering his qualifications and experience .
15 It is for the court to decide the weight which should be given to statements which are not made on oath and can not be tested by cross-examination .
16 Where there is a conflict of views it is for the court to decide on the nature of the examination or assessment governed as always by the need to give paramount consideration to the child 's welfare .
17 It rejected the majority view in Attwood that , in employment cases , there existed a third consideration viz : it is for the court to decide in its discretion whether or not to treat the two restraints as separate or not .
18 The House of Lords held that the question whether the conduct was prejudicial to the interests of the state was for the court and not for the jury .
19 Held , allowing the appeal , that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the court would not order a medical practitioner to treat his patient in a manner contrary to his clinical judgment and professional duty ; that the proper approach , pending any final decision , was for the court to consider the options available to it in exercising its inherent powers and to make such order as best served the child 's true interests , and it would be wrong to apply the principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctions in civil proceedings ; that , further , the judge 's order was defective in that it failed to specify the precise requirements imposed on the health authority and to take sufficient account of that authority 's distribution of resources in its patient care ; and that , accordingly , the order would be set aside ( post , pp. 516B–G , 517D–F , 518E–F , H — 519C , E–H , 520B–C , E–F ) .
20 It was for the court to :
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